Did researchers make a mistake on the elections again?

For years and year, in different countries, various continents, I have been conducting researches and I have been showing them to the politicians. Most often, as a firs slide they ask for political party rating, and as a second they want politician ratings – and that is what mostly what their interest is. Honestly, some of them look in which way does the country go and eventually the problems. They go through all other matchings and follow-up slides with a phone in their hands or with the “hurry up – why are you bothering me with this… “ look in their eyes.

When we talk about rating of political parties there are only two reactions of the politicians: our rating is great and this research is not good at all, we have more for sure. In Serbia, BiH, East Africa (not in Bulgaria, which is interesting) bad ratings, provided by the researchers is usually followed up by the sentence: they have never guessed…

This is why I was interested in how  accurate were the researches for the 2016 elections in Serbia, especially because agencies were saying that there were 20% of those that would vote, but are not declaring for who would they vote. 

I took 5 researches by different agencies done from 20.04 to 23.04. Results are shown in the graph:

If we assume that the possible error is +/- 2.5% there are no parties that are out of this margin.

Where do this small differences come from – my speculation:

- SPS voter are solid and this party basically there is no error.

- DS and DJB – it appears that the part of their voters was usually in that group: I’m voting, I’m not saying anything. That was the socially accepted answer provided by the surveyed because of the negative campaign against these two parties.

Other parties didn’t manage to take their potential voters out on the election day…

And as I say on the lectures: you have to believe in the public opinion researches because you believe in the blood testing. In both cases we take the sample. Nobody is taking all of your blood out to see if you are ill. It is the same here – researches are usually experienced enough and they care about their profession enough. Still, same as you double check with doctors you double check with the researching agencies. Do not rely just on one.

One of the key reasons...

… why It's enough (Dosta je bill - DJB) is over census is in, if we spoke in chess terms, miniature that DJB played after the mistake of Democratic party (DS) and coalition of ex Serbian president Tadić, SDS, Jovanović from Liberal democratic party (LDP) and regional leader Čanak from LSV (also known as ČedaBorisČanak)…

Do you all remember the bags from the beginning of the second round of presidential campaign in 2012? Now, remember the shouts from DJB to DS in region Vojvodina and Belgrade municipalities Stari grad and Vračar about the list and the participation on elections. Similar? I think so.

Radulović from DJB does not speak the truth when he says that he was under media blockade. When it matters for the campaign, in the last 2 weeks – he was present in absolutely all media. If you don’t trust me just google radulovic ds listaand pay attention on the dates, and what appears. In that time DJB’s strongest attacks were towards DS.

Why?

Let’s go back on the researching… Most of them showed that there is over 20% of people that want to vote, but don’t know for who. With further analysis (by gender, education, where they live, employment, earnings…) you realize that more than half of those are potentially, in the way that it has been called until 2012, pro-european option. If we talk numbers, that is more than 350.000 people that wanted to vote on this elections, but they didn’t want to vote for the ruling parties or right-nacionalist parties. Basically, on the republic elections, they could choose between DS, ČBČ, DJB or abstinence.

Opportunity was used excellent by the DJB strategists. Their simple message box that was primarily focused against Vučić and SNS, that they were repeating for almost 18 months, made their electorate body solid, but also, it didn’t bring new voters. Now, they were provided with few more messages like: However, in Vojvodina, Demokratska stranka’s biggest fear is Dosta je bilo movement or They are fighting against us with all their power and by any means necessary, because they desperately want to save their undeserved official positions and salaries or We strongly condemn all the illegal games that are being used to obstruct elections process, games which Demokratska stranka used the most. We expected this kind of moves from the SNS, but not from the DS. Strong attacks like this, repeated for days, with inarticulate responses from DS and ČBČ coalition in the end gave positive result.

And for the end. Why is this formula 1 an illustration. On the races, often one driver isolates and nobody can catch up with him. Then, directors are looking for some other duels that can be interesting for the public. They usually finish just like this – at least one of the participants ends up race earlier.

Nisam pravnik...

... ali ajd da pokušam da objasnim...

Za one koji ne znaju postoji stalni sastav RIK-a (na lokalu birački odbor) i prošireni sastav. Stalni sastav se bira na predlog stranaka iz Parlamenta odnosno lokalne samouprave (grad, opština). U prošireni sastav ulaze predstavnici svih onih stranaka i grupa građana koji imaju svoje liste na izborima. Kako bi se izbeglo da jedna stranka ima većinu u članu 29. je zapisano:

Nijedna politička stranka, stranačka koalicija ili druga politička organizacija ne mogu imati više od polovine članova u stalnom sastavu svih organa za sprovođenje izbora.  

Koliko shvatam - većina odluka RIK-a je ovom prilikom izglasana JEDNOGLASNO. Što znači da su se sve stranke složile oko obaranja izbora na pojedinim BM. Povika samo na predsednika RIK-a je zbog toga potpuno sumanuta i ne odgovara istini.

Na ovim izborima je bilo 8387 biračkin mesta. Ukoliko ste prijavili tzv. punu listu imate pravo na po kontrolora i zamenika u proširenom sastavu biračkog odbora. Znači potrebno vam je 16.774 njih - imenom i prezimenom, sa biračkim pravom i JMBG-om. Ukoliko ste u lokalnoj vlasti verovatno već imate i članove stalnog sastava. Sve u svemu, iz iskustva, potrebno vam je skoro 20.000 ljudi za kontrolu izbora. Na sve to dodate i ovu komplikaciju:

Član 30



Članovi i zamenici članova organa za sprovođenje izbora ne mogu biti lica koja su međusobno srodnici po pravoj liniji bez obzira na stepen srodstva, u pobočnoj zaključno sa trećim stepenom srodstva, a u tazbinskom srodstvu zaključno sa drugim stepenom srodstva, kao ni bračni drugovi i lica koja su u međusobnom odnosu usvojioca i usvojenika, odnosno staraoca i štićenika.

Sigurno je, opet iz iskustva, da je mali broj stranaka bio sposoban da ovo sprovede. O mnogim grupama građana koje su učestvovale na ovim izborima - ne želim da gubim reči. Do mene su dolazile, istine radi, glasine, da mnogi od tih GG prodaju svoja mesta u proširenom sastavu biračkih odbora jer jednostavno nemaju infrastrukturu. A što ne uzeti neki dinar...

Dok sam se bavio izborima u Srbiji odmah po predaji liste i njenom usvajanju, čitav tim ljudi od centrale stranke do najmanjeg opštinskog odbora je počinjao da radi na ovome i to im je bio jedini posao tokom izbornog procesa. Nije samo u pitanju bilo mehaničko sakupljanje imena i njihovih JMBG-ova već i pokušaj edukacije kontrolora - pogotovu onih koji vas predstavljaju i broje vaše glasova na BM gde očekujete iznad prosečni rezultat.

Po mojoj teoriji u Srbiji izbori se završavaju kada vaš predstavnik potpiše zapisnik sa biračkog mesta, uzme svoj primerak (ako ste u prve 4 stranke) ili ga fotografiše. Džaba vam i najbolja kampanja ako nemate sigurnog i edukovanog čoveka na biračkom mestu.

O izbornom zakonodavstvu...

... i iskustvima iz Bugarske ali i ostalih zemalja. Neke od ovih stvari bi mogli i mi da primenimo.


1. Od kada krenu izborne radnje, stranke i grupe građana koje žele da učestvuju na izborima moraju da sakupe 5.000 potpisa. Imaju nedelju dana...

2. CIK (Bugarska izborna komisija) proglašava koje su sve stranke sakupile potpise i samo one mogu da učestvuju na izborima.

3. Kada CIK proglasi stranke koje mogu da učestvuju na izborima - kreće pravljenje koalicija koje traje takože nedelju dana. Bitno je naglasiti da u pravljenju koalicija ne mogu učestvovati oni koji prethodno nisu sakupili potpise.

4. Onda se žrebom izvlače broj koji će stranka imati na izbornom listiću. Slično kao kod nas na izborima za predsednika.

5. Sistem je proporcionalan sa jednom preferencijom. Znači, glasate za stranku ali možete glasati i za jednog čoveka sa liste. Ko ima više preferencijalnih glasova ide na vrh. Tako se često dešavalo da neko sa dna liste preskoči prvog. E sad, često se ovde dešava problem nazvan u Bugarskoj 15/15. Naime, birači, pogotovu sa nižim obrazovanjem često glasaju za broj stranke ali i za isti broj na listi. Tako je na prvim izborima na kojima se ovaj sistem primenjivao (EU parlament 2014) desilo da je na listi BSP - Bugarske socijalističke partije - pobedio momak na 15 mestu što je bio i broj liste - a ne nosilac i predsednik stranke Sergej Stanišev.

6. Ukoliko želite da se reklamirate na nekom mediju morate objaviti ugovor u kome će sve biti navedeno. I broj reklama, i dužina spota, i cena. Nema reklama pre objave ugovora. Isto pravilo važi i za internet. Ukoliko medij krene sa reklamom pre objavljenog ugovora ne kažnjava se stranka već medij i njegov vlasnik.

7. U Bugarskoj se glasovi broje na isti način kako kod nas - na samom biračkom mestu. No ima jedna ogromna razlika - potpisani zapisnici se odmah skeniraju na svakom BM i šalju automatski na sajt CIK-a. Kasnije izmene nisu moguće. No, poučen nekim ranijim iskustvima i iz Bugarske ali i iz BiH, više sam za model koji se primenjuje u Velikoj Britaniji. Naime, po zavšenom glasanju sve kutije se nose na jedno mesto (Dom kulture, sportska hala) gde ih broje, ne članovi partije, već izabrani građani. Članovi partije mogu samo da gledaju brojanje sa pristojne udaljenosti. Naravno da kasnije, po završenom brojanju mogu da naprave uvid u listiće.

8. Kao poslednje ali ne svakako manje važno je direktan izbor gradonačelnika.

Malo o izlaznosti

Pogledajmo šta kaže statistika o izborima...

Na izborima za Narodnu skupštinu Republike Srbije od 1990 godine izlaznost je u apsolutnim brojkama izgledala ovako:





Kada to pretvorimo u procente dobijamo:



Prosečna izlaznost od 1990 do danas je 60.9%. Ukoliko izbacimo najveći i najmanji rezultat (1990 i 2014 god) dolazimo do prosečne izlaznosti od 60.56%

Naravno da izlaznost ima veze i sa kampanjom. Što je ona negativnija - to manja izlaznost i obrnuto. 

I za kraj ali ne kao poslednje - beli listići. Kao što sam jednom i napisao - oni su relativno najkonstantniji - na nivou su od oko 2,3% sem 2012 kada su imali 4.3%. 



E sad, šta raditi sa ovim brojevima je drugo pitanje. 

Predviđanja posle prvog kruga regionalnih izbora u Francuskoj

Nekoliko stvari oko regionalnih u Francuskoj koje treba znati:
- sistem je iz dva kruga.
- u drugi krug idu 3 kandidata!
- Drugi krug je već u nedelju 13.12...

Šta je takeway iz kampanje:

1. Desnica i ultra desnica i dalje rastu.
2. Levica i centar-desno moraju da se ujedine u drugom krugu ukoliko žele da zaustave nacionaliste. Za 

to nemaju baš mnogo vremena jer je II krug već u nedelju 13.12

3. I Oland i Sarkozi su gubitnici u ovim izborima. Socijalisti nisu uspeli da pretvore odličan rejting Olanda u izborni rezultat. Sarkozi je pokušao da se takmiči u retorici sa nacionalistima - i izgubio dosta glasova zbog toga.

4. Ovo je bila poslednja izborna provera pred velike, predsedničke, izbore 2017-te. LePenova stranka će biti prvi put na vlasti. Sve stranke u Fr se nadaju da će to otvoriti oči biračima.

5. Ono što se desilo na izborima u Francuskoj neće ostati samo u Francuskoj. Biće putokaz za sve ostale izbore u 2016 godini. Nacionalistima će ovaj izborni uspeh LePena dati krila. Socijalisti će ostati bez pravog odgovora na imigrantsku krizu. Centar - desno stranke će poput Sarkozija usvojiti oštriju retoriku - više primerenu desnici..

Vreme će pokazati da li sam u pravu... 

Da li smo išta naučili iz Obamine pobede 2012-te godine?

 Pobeda Baraka Obame 6. Novembra 2012. istorijska je na mnogo načina. Bilo je lako za poverovati da je bila sigurna, bilo zbog demografskih trendova bilo zbog slabosti guvernera Romnija. Protiv sam takvog pojednostavljenog gledanja. Dosta stvari je bilo protvi njega - slaba ekonomija; frustracija jer nije uspeo da nadigra ostale frakcije unutar Vašingtona; konstantno osporavanje njegovih najvećih inicijativa, kao što su ekonomski podsticajni paket i/ili zakon o reformi zdravstva. Protivnik je bio finansijski jak a ušao je u trku sa biračima privlačnom istorijom poslovnih uspeha.

Činjenica je da su Republikanci i Mit Romni mogli da pobede na ovim izborima. Činjenica da nisu pobedili govori u prilog seriji strateških odluka i praktičnih koraka koje su načinili Predsednik Obama i njegov tim – neke tokom 2012. godine, a neke još tokom kampanje 2008. godine i odmah iza nje.

Svaka država je drugačija kao što su i svaki izbori jedinstveni. Ono što je bilo dobro za Obamu neće biti moguće iskoristiti u mnogim kampanjama ni u SAD a kamoli u svetu. Ipak i pored toga, partije, kandidati, lideri i organizacije iz celog sveta mogu naučiti mnogo toga iz Obamine pobede. U ovom tekstu, pokušaću da predstavim 5 stvari koje su Obama i njegov tim preduzeli a koje su doprinele pobedničkom rezultatu. Nadamo se da će vam biti od koristi – i kao uvid u politiku Sjedinjenih Država, ali i kao izvor ideja za strategije koje možete iskoristiti za sopstvene potrebe.

Pet faktora koji su doveli Obamu do pobede

1. Obama je definisao bitku prema uslovima koji njemu odgovaraju. Ovo je nešto što često govorim kandidatima i strankama: morate definisati teme za vaše glasače pre nego što priđu biračkom mestu na dan izbora. Koji god kandidat da uokviri izbore obično izađe kao pobednik.

Mit Romni se mučio, iako mu je zadatak bio lakši. Tokom leta i početkom jeseni 2012-te, većina birača nije osećala ekonomski oporavak. Nezaposlenost je bila iznad 8% tokom većeg dela kampanje (tokom većine meseci i bliže 10 procenata) i sve do poslednjeg meseca 60 % USA birača je verovalo da država ide u pogrešnom smeru. Romni je imao potencijalnu temu - posrćući biznis kojem on zna i može da pomogne. Ipak, ovi izbori se nisu sveli na to ko može da ‘napravi’ više radnih mesta. Čak da je ovo i bila odluka njegovog štaba, mogao je da prođe mnogo bolje jer je i u post-izbornoj anketi, Romni imao prednost od 4 % u odgovoru na pitanje: ko bi bolje vodio ekonomiju i 5 % prednosti u odgovoru na pitanje: ko bi bio najbolji u stvaranju novih radnih mesta.

Kako je Obama sprečio da ovo budu pitanja koja će glasačima odzvanjati u glavi dok glasaju na biračkom mestu? Pre svega, on je proširio teme sa pitanjem (i odgovorom) o budućnost srednje klase. Birače je jednostavno pitao: „Da li želite nekoga ko se bori za srednju klasu, ili želite da se vratite propalim politikama koje su i nanele štetu ljudima kao što ste i vi?“ Ovo je promenilo izbore iz referenduma o tome da li država ide u pravom smeru u izbor čije politike će promeniti stvari na bolje za birače koji su srednja klasa. Post-izborna anketa pokazuje da je Obama imao prednost nad Mit Romnijem od 9 % u tome koji bi kandidat uradio više za oporavak srednje klase – iako je zaostajao u tome ko bi bio bolji za radna mesta i ekonomiju. Ovo mu je i dalo mogućnost da stekne većinu elektorata.

Delom, Romni je izgubio primat u temama o radnim mestima i ekonomiji odabirom Pol Rajana za Podredsednika. Rajan, kongresmen iz Viskonsina, bio je najpoznatiji po budžetskom planu u kom je srezao usluge i vrlo kontroverznim gledištima na ulogu vlade. Birajući Rajana, Romni je zamutio izbor koji je on kao kandidat nudio glasačima: umesto da to bude izbor ko je najbolji za radna mesta i ekonomiju, postao je izbor između suparničkih gledišta na ulogu vlade i kako Vašington služi siromašnima i najranjivijima.

Sve ovo je igralo na ruku Obamine definicije Romnija pogotovo nakon što je uragan „Sendi“, nedelju dana pre izbora, podsetio glasače na to šta vlada može da učini u slučaju krize. Anketa pokazuje da je najsnažnija tema među razlozima glasača da glasaju protiv Romnija bila to što nije razumeo običnog čoveka i što je favorizovao bogate, ali i zbog njegovog komentara kako „47 procenata“ Amerike zavisi od vlade, njegovih korporativnih politika, i zbog njegovog insistiranju na poreskim olakšicama za bogate.

2. Biti u vlasti i voditi kampanju je poseban izazov u politici. Mnogi politički lideri nakon nekog vremena provedenog na vlasti pričaju o dostignućima i koriste statistku i brojeve kako bi pokazali konkretna poboljšanja.

To funkcioniše kada je napredak evidentan i kada su glasači optimistični, ali je veoma problematično kada je  napredak nevidljiv ili spor a glasači frustrirani (misle da država ide u pogrešnom pravcu). Kao što je primećeno, Obama je ušao u ove izbore sa jakom većinom koje se osećala kao da država ide u pogrešnom smeru. Job apruval mu je bio ispod 50 procenata na početku 2012. Otvarala su se nova radna mesta, ali sporo, dok većina glasača taj napredak još nije osećala ili primećivala. Iz našeg iskustva širom sveta, percepcija glasača o rastu broja radnih mesta u državi uvek dosta zaostaje za realnošću. Postojala je realna opasnosta da ukoliko bi Obama previše istakao svoje uspehe, koje birači nisu osećali, ili naveo statistiku u koju nisu verovali, rizikovao da zvuči van pameti, otsečen od realnosti pa čak i arogantan.

Osećalo se kako se Obama i njegova kampanja ponekad muče sa ovim izazovom. Uvek sam imao i sumnje u vezi njegovog „Forward“ slogana, jer je bio baziran na verovanju koje mnogi glasači nisu delili – da je država već počela da se kreće unapred. Neke Obamine reklame su imale pogrešan prizvuk – poput one u kojoj je glumac Morgan Frimen narator, a koja troši previše vremena na prošlost i  probleme koje su Obama i njegova Vlada prevazišli.

Tokom vremena Obama i njegov tim su razvijali temu i odgovarali na izazov kako je kampanja napredovala. Konkretno, on je preuzeo 4 koraka da ponovo otvori birače ka sebi tokom izborne godine:

·      „Razumem – frustrirani ste.“ Ovu rečenicu mnogi lideri jako teško izgovaraju, jer misle kako ona odaje slabost ili čak neuspeh. Ipak jedna od stvari koje je Obama učinio kako treba je njegova rečenica „Nismo još učinili dovoljno za vas.“ On je bio svestan činjenice da su uslovi teški i da su mnogi birači nezadovoljni. Ove rečenice su ‘otvorile’ birače, i pokazale im da je u dodiru sa njihovim realnim, svakodnevnim, ekonomskim brigama.

·      Podsetio je birače na njegova neosporna dostignuća. Obama je suzio broj uspeha o kojima je pričao samo na one koje je većina birača bila spremna da prizna – a pogotovo na: „Osama bin Laden je mrtav a GM je živ.“ Ovo ističe neosporive uspehe spoljne politike Obamine administracije, i brzu akciju njegove administracije da sačuva General Motors i auto industriju Sjedinjenih Država.

·      Postavio je jasne izbore za budućnost. Iako mnogi misle da je Obamina kampanja mogla da predloži smeliju agendu za drugi mandat, ona je i dalje uspevala da stvori neke jasne izbore: implementirati Zakon o reformi zdravstva nasuprot Romnijevom protivljenju; povećati porez za bogate protiv smanjenja poreza za bogate; sačuvati „Medicare“ ili ga pretvoriti u vaučer program; fiksni datum za povlačenje Američke vojske iz Avganistana ili obavezivanje otvorenog roka. Na kraju, birači su razumeli koji su ulozi i izbori za sledećih četiri godine.

·      Podsećao je stalno birače na „old bad days“. Da je pitanje bilo samo o ekonomskim uslovima u Sjedinjenim Državama, Obama bi izbore sigurno izgubio. Umesto toga, on je držao fokus birača na uslovima koje je on nasledio i politikama koje su stvorile te uslove. On je uspešno podsetio birače na rizike vraćanju (Bušovim) politikama koje su i dovele Ameriku u problem.

3. Brojevi su bitni. Da je 6. Novembra proglašen još jedan pobednik, to bi bio kreator anketa i statističar Nejt Silver, kreator Bloga 536 „New York Times“-a. Silver je pratio sve javno objavljene ankete tokom kampanje i na nacionalnom i na državnom nivou. Primenjivao je statističke modele zasnovane na ovim informacijama kako bi dobio procenat verovatnoće da pobede Obama ili Romni i prilagođavao ih tokom kampanje. Na dan izbora, Silver je stavio da je Obamina verovatnoća da pobedi iznad 90 procenata. Nakon što su rezultati obrađeni, ispalo je da je Silver pogodio tačan ishod u 50 od 50 država. Mnogi su osporavali Silvera tokom kampanje, tvrdeći da se previše fokusira na brojeve a nedovoljno na „nematerijale“ stvari – poput momentuma, emocija, dinamike izlaznosti, ili uticaja različitih lokalnih kampanja. Ipak Silverov uspeh pokazuje da su precizni brojevi potrebniji kao osnova za efektivnu strategiju, a ne intuitivni osećaji marketinških stručnjaka. To je činjenica kaja važi u svim zemljama sveta. Romnijeva kampanja je žrtva verovanja da se realnost stvarnih brojeva može izbeći. U poslednjim danima kampanje, njegov štab je i dalje trošio resurse u Minesoti i Pensilvaniji – državama u kojima su ankete pokazivale da Obama ima sigurnu prednost. Da je Romni obratio više pažnje na Silverovo modelovanje, možda bi se više fokusirao na Floridu, gde je Obama pobedio za oko 73.000 glasova (oko .009% od svih glasova). Pobeda u Floridi bi značila 29 elektorska glasa više za Romnija, i mnogo neizvesniji krajnji rezultat.

4. Obamin fokus na „Rising American Electorate.“ Jedna od najznačajnijih lekcija izbora 2012. u Sjedinjenim Državama je da dugoročni trendovi u demografiji mogu da naprave veliku razliku u elektorskoj dinamici i strategiji. To je primenljivo na različite države i na različite načine, ali je bilo jasno 2012 u Sjedinjenim Državama.

2004 godine, Republikanci su opisali Ameriku kao 51-49 naciju i tvrdili da su stvorili „stalnu većinu.“ Vreme nije bilo na strani Republikanske partije, pogotovo za vođenje kampanje dizajnirane da privlači isključivo bele muške glasače a da i ni ne pokušavaju da dopru do manjina. Nasuprot tome, Obama se direktno obraćao „Rising American Electorate“ – mladima, neudatim ženama i manjinama svih vrsta.

Ovi glasački blokovi su stabilno rasli tokom vremena. Na primer, udeo Amerikanaca koji mogu da glasaju a nisu belci uvećao se za oko 2-3 procentna poena od 2008 do 2012. Udeo neudatih žena u biračkom telu se takođe uvećao. Sve ukupno, ove grupe sada čine 48 procenata birača Sjedinjenih Država – i oni su dali Obami preko 60 procenata svojih glasova.

Za ove glasače, dva najveća problema su bila: stvaranje radnih mesta i očuvanje penzionih benefita. Za one koji su dali izbor Predsedniku, bilo je jasno koji su im prioriteti – obnova srednje klase.

Obama ne samo da se obratio ovim glasačima, već je i pokrenuo program njihove masovne mobilizacije koji je pomogao da se osigura da ovi glasači zaista i izađu na glasanje – pošto mnogi u „Rising American Electorate“-a imaju ispod prosečnu sklonost izlaska na birališta.

Delom, Obama je pobedio mobilišući elektorat koji deluje kao budućnost Amerike, dok je Romni izgubio jer se obraćao elektoratu koji sve više deluje kao prošlost Amerike:

·      Izlaznost kod Hispano Amerikanaca je porasla, podižući ovu grupu na 10 procenata biračkog tela (sa 9% u 2008.). Obama je osvojio 71 procenat glasova Hispano Amerikanaca – porast sa 67 procenata koliko je imao 2008.

·      Jaz među polovima je bio velik na ovim izborima – Obama je osvojio ženske glasove u odnosu 55-44%, dok je Romni osvojio muške glasove u odnosu 52-45 procenata. Ipak, stvarni jaz je bio „marriage“ jaz. Među udatim ženama, Romni je imao prednost od 7 poena (53 prema 46 procenata), ali su neudate žene masovno podržale Obamu – 67 : 31. Neudate žene su činile skoro četvrtinu biračkog tela, i beleže brži porast od udatih žena.

·      Mnogi su predviđali da će mlađi glasači (mlađi od 30 godina) ostati kod kuće na ovim izborima, ali su oni zabeležili porast u udelu u elektoratima od 1 poena (na 19 %). Obama je pobedio kod ove grupe sa marginom od 23 poena; ne toliko dramatično kao njegova pobeda kod ovih glasača od 34 poena 2008. godine, ali i dalje daleko više nego što je Senator Džon Keri uradio 2004.

5. Obamina prednost u tehnologiji i organizaciji. Ova kampanja će uvek biti upoređivana sa Obaminom kandidaturom 2008. Organizaciju iz 2008., „Obama za Ameriku“, pretvorili su u „Organizacija za Ameriku“ odmah nakon prvih pobedničkih izbora. „Organizacija za Ameriku“ je bila konstantno prisutna u „glavnim“ državama, uključujući Ohajo i Floridu – što je retkost u međuizbornim godinama.

Bitno je podsetiti se da Obama nije imao izrazitu finansijsku prednost u odnosu na Romnija. Istina, uspeo je da prikupi preko 934 miliona dolara od strane više od 4 miliona unique donatora.

Obama je trošio novac na strateški način. Trošio ga je rano; bio je u etru ranije u ključnim državama, dok je Romni bio konzervativniji u trošenju u početku. I pored manje novca sveukupno, Obama je uspeo da pobedi Romnija „u etru“ mnogo pre početka zvanične kampanje. Rezultat je bila njegova mogućnost da ‘uokviri izbore’, i definiše Romnija. Mnogo pre nego što su Romni i njegovi „Super PACs“ krenuli punom parom sa novcem, Obamina poruka je već doprla do glasača.

Obama je takođe nadigrao Romnija u novim medijima i „online outreach“-u. Sve u svemu, obe kampanje su potrošile 6 puta više za „online“ nego 2008. Ovde je Obama imao istinsku prednost jer je potrošio više novca od Romnija u odnosu 2:1 na „online“ reklame, trošeći ranije i kreativnije. Obamina kampanja je nastavila da redefiniše kako se digitalni mediji koriste da se pobedi na izborima, dok je Romnijeva kampanja uvek bila par koraka iza.

Bosnian election drama

Results of general elections held on Sunday 10.12.2014 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which were chosen members of Presidency, President of Republika Srpska and members of legislative bodies on state, entity and canton levels, are still being waited for. Although all kinds of flags, followed by horns, passed through streets of Sarajevo, Mostar and Banja Luka celebrating victory, Bosnia and Herzegovina is far from having election winners.

BOSNIAN ELECTION DRAMA

Roles:

SDA – Stranka demokratske akcije Party of Democratic Action

Since the first democratic elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992), SDA was an unavoidable political factor, that even after war managed to keep major influence in bosnian political circles. Started by Alija Izetbegovic, who has run the country during the war 1992-1995, today is leaded by his son, Bakir, who is running for his second mandate in Presidency, and also for confirmation in inside party battles. SDA is a member of a European Peoples Party (EPP)

SDP – Socialdemokratska partija Social Democratic Party

SDP is politicaly and legaly considered for a successor of Communist Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Head of the party is Zlatko Lagumdzija, who was Minister of Foreign Affairs in his last mandate. SDP’s political acting is considered nominaly left oriented. Social democrats managed to take charge in BIH Federation entity in 2000., under the wider coalition “Alliance for Changes”. After that, they have hit the bottom, from which they rose in 2010 with a huge win. In the next 4 years SDP will go through a period of coalition with SDA , but also internal fluctuations, that led to the departure of Zeljko Kosmic, member of  BiH Presidency and one of the key people of SDP’s campaign “Coutry for people” from October 2010.

HDZ BiH – Hrvatska demokratska zajednica BiH Croatian Democratic Union BiH

HDZ BiH is a political party that started as daughter party of Croatian HDZ, and it is one of the winners of the firs democratic elections, alongside SDA and SDS. Soon after elections, currents from West Herzegovina took charge, and they will stay key base for elections for years after war. Major disagreements inside party happened in 2006, when HDZ’s representatives took down an agreed package of amendments on BiH Constitution, after which that current, led by Bozo Ljubinkovic and Martin Raguz, started HDZ 1990.

HDZ 1990- Hrvatska demokratska zajednica 1990 - Croatian democratic union 1990

They are second in power Croatian party. After 2010 elections, there was a chance for HDZ 1990 to go in “platform” with SDP and SDA, but putting HDZ BiH on side made parties from Sarajevo  to include HSP and Peoples Party of Working for Better in federal government. Martin Raguz became head of the party in 2013 and significantly changed its profile and political program, so HDZ 1990 became more distant from HDZ BiH and it’s leader Dragan Covic.

SBB – Savez za bolju buducnost - Union for Better Future

SBB is positioning itself on political right-center. Started in 2009 by Fahrudin Radoncic, it has huge support in Dnevni avaz, biggest printed media in country. On general elections in 2010, Radoncic lost in run for member of Presidency by 20 thousand votes.

DF – Demokratska fronta - Democratic Front

Democratic Front – Zeljko Kosmic, started after schism between Komsic and Lagumdzija, that was about details of  agreement  between HDZ BiH and SDP, with which they changed the way of electing members of Presidency and representatives of Peoples parlaiment. DF had a fast growth as a political alternative. Emir Suljagic, who people see as a factor, alongside Kostic, of SDP’s success in 2010, will run for a membership in Presidency.

SDS – Srpska demokratska stranka - Serbian Democratic Party

Established by Radovan Karadzic, SDS was a third link in chain of “anti-communist” coalition. During the war, and until 2006 (except one short period of conflict between Banja Luka and Pale, when SNSD took charge with support of international community) SDS was a sole leader on political scene of Republika Srpska entity. On this elections,  SDS formed a coalition “Union for changes” that gave candidates for a member of Presidency (Mladen Ivanic, PDP) and president of Republika Srpska (Ognjen Tadic, SDS) as only opposition against SNSD.

SNSD – Savez nezavisnih socijaldemokrata - Union of Independent Social Democrats

During its beginnings, SNSD was a political alternative for SDS. In 1998 they formed an minority government, which was short-termed. With changed program, Milorad Dodik comes back on charge in Republika Srpska few years later, using fluctuations inside SDS, when he wins elections in 2006, becoming dominant in Banja Luka.

SDA has continued its growth that started during 2012 local elections, while their vice president, Bakir Izetbegovic, convincingly won on elections for Bosnian member of Presidency. Winner of the last elections, SDP, lost almost 200 000 votes in last four years, and it is not seeing brighter future. HDZ BiH won majority of Croatian votes, at least those that were not “invalid”, and their president Dragan Covic has become Izetbegovic’s co-worker in Presidency as Croatian member.

Even though Martin Raguz had best campaign by all rankings, president of HDZ 1990 didn’t make it in the run for BiH Presidency as Croatian member.

SNSD survived a serious blow in Republika Srpska, but at least Dodik will stay President of Republika Srpska, while his party colleagues disappointed. “Soft” majority is expected in Parliament of Republika Srpska, together with parties that supported his candidature, but it is uncertain to say that it will happen for sure…

After 30 days of official campaign, but also unofficial that has been going on since February protests, it can be concluded that strong party infrastructure won yet another elections. Between emotion (message) and technique (organization), second one won. With about 40 thousand “white papers” in Federation and 29 thousand in Republika Srpska, then 36 thousand invalid in Federation and 18 thousand in Republika Srpska by other criteria, election monitoring was a disaster. Although official reports state that elections passed in “fair and democratic atmosphere according to electoral laws and rules, with small amount of irregularities and incidents”, it is hard to believe in something like that.

Researches

BiH is probably hardest country for public opinion researches of all European countries. Three nations that were in war with each other, fear, socially acceptable responses instead of true ones… And those are not all the problems. The biggest one is that last census took place in 1991, and the one that took place in 2013 (under huge political pressures) is still not available for researchers. Unique thing for all the researches was the answer on question about the direction in which is country going. Wrong direction was the answer of 90%, and in some researches 95%, asked, which is an infamous world record as far as I know. Even residents of Somaliland had lower percentages of negative answers. Researches state that from 58% to 65% of asked say that major problems are economic, especially those connected with unemployment. Other big problem is poverty as societies problem, as around 12% stated as major problem. On the third place came an eternal problem of all countries on Balkan – corruption – that around 11% of asked stated as major problem.

What researches have been showing all the time was low voter turnout. By all agencies and by my methodology, in June it was 48%, while it was raised by campaign to an unacceptable 53%. Yet, it should be noted that numerous people from diaspora are considered regular voters, and they are listed in voter registers in their home towns if they do not apply for “voting by mail”. Reasons for abstinence have been presented right before the elections by Srdjan Puhalo and Nada Perisic in their work “Abstinence in Bosnia and Herzegovina”. Their finding were confirmed by other researches where asked people stated as reasons against voting: voting will not change anything (32%), I am disappointed in political parties and candidates (25%), I do not have for who to vote (24%)… Possible reasons to vote were: politicans that are in charge for long time to retreat, new ones to come (24%), changes for the better (24%), parties to promote young people (22%)…

Campaign

Researches conducted in June by IPSOS BiH for NDI showed that governments of BiH Federation and Republika Srpska do not have peoples trust. BiH Federation government got 79% negative marks, and Republika Srpska government got 63% negative marks. Most of the parties took this data seriously and run campaigns as they have never been in government.

Even though they also had access to this data, most interesting approach to the campaign, later to be seen as completely wrong, had SDA BiH which defended their works in last period. With this campaign they took all the merits, but all the responsibility for bad economic situation from last period too. Decision to give money designed for billboards in funds for flood damage repairs was good, but for some other party and other country. Later, when some billboards eventually appeared, they lowered already low parties and their president’s credibility. Campaign that started as positive, ended in fully negative tone, only against Democratic Front and their leader Zeljko Komsic.

This strategy of SDP BiH suited SDA, that on similar way as in 2010 pushed over margins their earlier coalition partner, Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Completely in their role, with solid and clear message box, without paying attention on their rivals, they were speaking as they have never been on charge. Although they were targets of constant attacks, by Democratic Front and SBB in first place, SDA’s officials kept back from returning fire. Campaign was won by technique (infrastructure). Everyone in BiH was surprised by SDA’a outdoor campaign. Exceptional amount of billboards with Bakir Izetbegovic was all over BiH from the first day of the campaign. Immediately after billboards a wave of pole posters, with same design as billboards and with amazing amount of different characters and names, has followed.  Although it seemed as a mistake in beginning, as time passed by I have understood that strategy is really good and supports their main message – In unity lays power.

By all researches, strongest pole positions in the beginning of July were held by Democratic Front, new political party that emerged from schism between  Zeljko Komsic and Zlatko Lagumdzija in SDP, and Union for Better Future of Fahrudin Radoncic.

DF’s campaign started as a leadership campaign by their candidate for President Emir Suljagic, together with Komsic, one of the rare leaders with positive marks in relevant researches. DF, mostly Emir Suljagic, had chance to profile themselves with strong message and positive campaign as only serious rivals against Izetbegovic and SDA. However, most of the messages turned into attacks against Izetbegovic and SDA, but also against Lagumdzija and SDP BiH. Negative campaign is not bad, especially if you want to create black and white picture. But negative campaign, and strategists that worked for DF had to be aware of that, lowers voter turnout which suits parties with better organization and more core voters. SDP BiH took the bait and responded. SDA was silent but they were showering DF, especially Emir Suljagic, with negativites through “friendly” medias. Last train for DF’s strategists were TV duels. SDA’s strategists decided that Izetbegovic should not participate in television debates with rivals, and with that, direct confrontation with Suljagic, in which Izetbegovic would probably lose, was avoided.

Absence of Izetbegovic’s reaction actually disabled development of campaign where DF makes the rules. Instead of changing the campaign that does not have any effects, DF’s strategists were hopelessly stuck for the existing. Although they were leading in beginning, in the last two weeks when everybody already have entered in their campaigns, it seemed like DF’s message is perishing. With that will match a panic attack on Martin Raguz in the last week of campaign. Action of putting posters all over Sarajevo and some other cities was led by amateur logic that with negative message Bosnian candidates can take back votes that Raguz already has taken. Result was indeed achieved, but in other direction. Raguz’s voters did not go back to their corpus, but went to abstinence. In this way, posters worked only for Dragan Covic. At the same time, part of the voters in Sarajevo will go for their second best choice, Nasa stranka (Our Party), which will put Denis Gratz in Federation Parliament.

On the other side, Dragan Covic, known for his earlier arrangements and alliance with Milorad Dodik, and by fact that he has organized and attended Darijo Kordic’s (sentenced war criminal) reception after release from prison this year in Busovaca, was perceived as a far worse option between two that could take Croatian chair in Marsala Tita Street.

With an open and a completely disoriented attack on Raguz in the last seven days, they were trying to equal him with Covic, with a goal of cutting down the support in Bosnian election corpus. This is specifically interesting from the ideological aspect, if there is ideology in front of interest in Bosnia and Herzegovina at all, since DF was created when Komsic left SDP because of the agreement between Covic and Lagumdzija. DF had to know that by working against Raguz, they work directly for Covic, who will advocate separating of voting units for the two members of Presidency that come from Federation, that is a foundation of above mentioned agreement, and schism between Zeljko and Zlatko.

From this disappointing DF’s strategy, Covic and Izetbegovic come as winners. Death of the SDA’s president Sulejman Tihic and his earlier absence from parties leadership, and also maybe the fact that Izetbegovic’s inner party opponents did not have another weapon, resulted that he has followed his parties results, which was not the case in earlier elections. In that battle, Fahrudin Radoncic kept his base, and finished in second place, with increase of votes. For post-election coalitions is important his first addressing, in which besides SBB’s, he states DF’s good results. However, in those calculations, SDA and HDZ BiH will be present in Federation. All depends of that how much will all parties strive for coalition in all cantons, and entity, or this processes will go in other directions.

Between parties, biggest surprise for me in this election is Nasa stranka (Our Party). Even though they did not manage to enter all the Parliaments they run for, their campaign excited all the experts. Their success is even bigger considering their finances, and that they were without clear leader, but with lot of booths, best internet campaign, and door-to-door campaign in the last week when it is most important. Even bigger surprise is direct passage of their president Denis Gratz into Federal Parliament, through Sarajevo canton, although he was almost completely unknown to public. Their result confirms that BiH needs strong urban option that will be on the opposite side from national and nationalistic parties.

On the other side, in Republika Srpska, Ivanic is leading by an inch for the membership in Presidency. Between parties that supported Mladen Ivanic under coalition Savez za promene (Union for Changes) (leaded by SDS and PDP) and parties that support Zeljka Cvijanovic (leaded by SNSD and DNS) crucial votes in small amount were provided by Bosnian returnee community, yet Ivanic can expect bigger advantage when votes from abroad arrive. This happened despite presence of local deals on field, and instructions for returnees to vote vor Cvijanovic, about which public hums in Republika Srpska in the last few days.

Going back to the beginning, it should be said that SDS made point that there is no idea of “big” coalition with SNSD. “Domovina” (Homeland), coalition of Bosnian and Croatian parties in Republika Srpska, will have five or six mandates so they could lead to a more stable government in this entity, but also connections on federal level. Taking notice that SNSD earlier rejected possibility of making coalition with “Domovina”, there is a possibility for SDS, PDP, NDP and “Domovina”, including change of sides by some of the Dodik’s pre-election allies, to form a majority in Republika Srpska government. Though, it will depend on negotiations for Federal and Federation government.

Election campaign is over. Besides faces from poster that took chairs in Presidency, complexity of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political system leaves nobody free to say “who won” or 'will it be worse or even worser' . All tunnels and bridges have been formally opened. Balloons are blown out, cakes are eaten and jackets from pre-election conventions are packed. Months in front of us, in the more bureaucratic fashion, will be followed by strong efforts in changing of systematization of jobs. Government jobs of course, you did not believe in those 100 000 new ones, did you?

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